People run for cover after an explosion was heard in Tehran. Photograph: Majid Asgaripour/Reuters
Second Israeli-US attack during nuclear negotiations may finally jettison any chance of agreement
The attack mounted jointly by Israel and the US on Iran had been planned for months, but the timing, in the midst of negotiations between Iran and the US, will again raise questions about whether Washington was ever serious about striking a deal with Tehran.
In June last year, Israel, with the US later in tow, launched a 10-day attack on Iran just three days before Iran and the US were due to meet for a sixth set of talks.
So this assault , in the middle of a second negotiation process, must torpedo the chances of the Iranian regime ever taking a US offer of talks seriously. They have been stung twice. As one Iranian Telegram channel put it: Once again the US attacked while Iran was pursuing diplomacy. Once again diplomacy does not work with the terrorist state of the US.
Abbas Araghchi, the Iranian foreign minister, was acutely aware that Trump might jettison diplomacy, but felt it was a risk worth taking.
Clearly knowing what the US had planned, and how imminent a US military attack was, Badr Albusaidi, the foreign minister of Oman, which has been mediating the talks, made an emergency dash to Washington in a desperate attempt to put the best gloss on their progress . He even took the unusual step of going on CBS to reveal many of the secrets of the deal taking shape. A peace agreement was in reach, he said.
But Albusaidi was permitted only to meet the vice-president, JD Vance, to make the case that the talks were on the brink of a breakthrough. The deal would be far better than the 2015 agreement which Trump left in 2018, he said.
He claimed Iran had agreed to zero stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, the down-blending of its existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium inside Iran, and full verification access for the International Atomic Energy Agency. US weapons inspectors might even be allowed inside Iran alongside the inspectors from the IAEA UN body, he said. Iran would enrich only what it needed for its civil nuclear programme. A final agreement on principles could be signed this week and the details of how the verification system would work might take another three months.
There was little or nothing on offer on human rights, Irans ballistic missile programme or on its support for proxy forces in the region.
From Irans perspective, the issue of the 1,250-mile (2,000km) range of its ballistic missiles could be discussed in talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council, but the missiles were in principle part of Irans defences and, as the joint US-Israeli attack demonstrated, central to Iranian national security.
The previous Iranian foreign minister, Javad Zarif, had always defended the missiles by pointing out how defenceless Iran had been during the Iran-Iraq war. He suggested that if the US stopped selling arms across the Gulf, Iran would have less need for its own missile programme.
But this was neither an agenda nor a timetable that suited Trump. Indeed Steve Witkoff, his special envoy, hinted at what the president wanted when he said Trump was surprised Iran had not yet capitulated.
In justifying the attack, Trump did not delve into the progress of the talks, or the gaps that existed between the two sides. He simply declared: Irans threatening activities put the US, its forces and bases abroad and our allies around the world at risk.
Inside the US, the debate will soon start over whether Albusaidis assessment of the talks fruitfulness was justified. Needs-based enrichment at low levels and eradication of highly enriched stocks, if indeed that was offered by Iran, alongside verification would, on the surface, deprive Iran of the means to make a bomb. If so, Trump, encouraged by Israel and Republican hawks, will be accused of wilfully spurning an agreement that would have peacefully ended the threat posed by Irans nuclear programme for the last 30 years. Others will argue that the continuance of an irredeemable and repressive Iranian regime in itself was a threat to world security.
Either way, what is extraordinary is that Trump himself, prior to the attacks, made next to no attempt to articulate or justify to the American people , to Congress or to his allies his actions or his objectives.
以美两国在核谈判期间再度发动袭击，或将彻底葬送达成协议的任何可能
以色列和美国联合对伊朗发起的袭击已筹划数月，但行动时机正值伊朗与美国谈判期间，这将再次引发外界质疑：华盛顿是否曾真心实意要与德黑兰达成协议。
去年6月，以色列在美国随后加入的情况下，对伊朗发动了为期10天的袭击，而此时距离伊朗和美国预定举行第六轮会谈仅剩三天。
因此，在第二轮谈判进行期间发动的这次袭击，必然会使伊朗政权今后难以认真对待美国提出的对话提议。他们已两次遭受打击。正如一个伊朗Telegram频道所言：'美国又一次在伊朗寻求外交途径时发动攻击。再次证明，与这个恐怖主义国家美国的外交手段行不通。'
伊朗外长阿巴斯·阿拉格希深知特朗普可能放弃外交手段，但仍认为值得一试。
作为谈判调解方的阿曼外交大臣巴德尔·阿尔布赛迪深知美国的计划以及军事打击的迫在眉睫，他紧急奔赴华盛顿，竭力为谈判进展粉饰太平。他甚至一反常态地接受哥伦比亚广播公司采访，披露了正在成型的协议中的诸多秘密。他表示，和平协议已触手可及。
但阿尔布赛迪（Albusaidi）仅获准与副总统J·D·万斯会面，他提出当前谈判已濒临突破。他表示，这份协议将远胜于特朗普2018年退出的2015年协议。
他声称伊朗已同意实现高浓缩铀零库存，对境内现有高浓缩铀储备进行稀释降级，并允许国际原子能机构进行全面核查。他表示，美国武器核查人员甚至可能与联合国国际原子能机构的核查员一同获准进入伊朗。伊朗只会为民用核计划进行必要的铀浓缩。原则性最终协议或于本周签署，而核查系统运作的具体细节可能需要再耗时三个月敲定。
在人权、伊朗弹道导弹计划或其对地区代理武装力量的支持方面，几乎没有任何实质性进展。
伊朗方面认为，其弹道导弹2000公里（1250英里）射程问题可与海湾合作委员会进行磋商，但这些导弹原则上属于伊朗国防体系的重要组成部分。正如美以联合袭击所表明的那样，这些导弹对伊朗国家安全至关重要。
伊朗前外交部长穆罕默德·贾瓦德·扎里夫始终为导弹计划辩护，他指出伊朗在两伊战争期间曾处于毫无防御能力的境地。他表示，如果美国停止向海湾地区出售武器，伊朗对自身导弹计划的需求就会减少。
但这既不符合特朗普的议程安排，也不符合他的时间表。事实上，他的特使史蒂夫·维特科夫（Steve Witkoff）暗示了总统的意图——他表示特朗普对伊朗尚未屈服感到惊讶。
在为此次袭击辩护时，特朗普并未深入探讨谈判进展或双方存在的分歧。他只是简单地宣称：“伊朗的威胁性活动使美国、其海外驻军与基地以及我们在全球的盟友处于危险之中。”
美国国内即将展开一场辩论，焦点是阿尔布赛迪对会谈成果的评估是否合理。如果伊朗确实提出以低水平需求为基础的铀浓缩活动、消除高浓缩铀库存并接受核查，表面上看这将使伊朗失去制造核弹的手段。倘若如此，在以色列和共和党鹰派怂恿下的特朗普，将被指责蓄意拒绝一项本可和平终结伊朗核计划30年来所构成威胁的协议。另有人则会主张，这个无可救药且高压的伊朗政权本身的存在就是对世界安全的威胁。
无论如何，令人诧异的是，特朗普本人在袭击发生前，几乎未曾试图向美国民众、国会或盟友阐明或解释其行动与目标。
原创文章，作者：林诗雨，如若转载，请注明出处：http://m.gaochengzhenxuan.com/yule/8249.html
